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COLOMBIA’S POETIC WORLD OF AUTHORS’ MORAL 
RIGHTS: CONSIDERATIONS ON IMPRISONING A 
PROFESSOR FOR PLAGIARISM 
Carlos Castellanos Rubio † 
Translated by David Cromwell‡ 
Abstract: The following is a translation of Carlos Castellanos Rubio’s article in 
the June 2011 edition of La Revista de Derecho, Comunicaciones y Nuevas Tecnologías, 
a Colombian legal periodical.  The article discusses a 2010 Colombian Supreme Court of 
Justice decision that sentenced Professor Luz Mary Giraldo to two years in prison plus 
monetary and civil sanctions for plagiarizing a student’s thesis, “The Poetic World of 
Giovanni Quessep.”  The decision has been controversial in Colombia for a variety of 
reasons, and many have accused the Court of judicial activism.  Much of this criticism 
stems from the Court convicting Giraldo of violating the student’s moral right to publish, 
or not publish, her “unpublished” work, based on an expansive reading of that statute.  
These critics have pointed out that the student’s work was published, and sitting in her 
university’s library.  Others have decried the severity of the sentence, as it is the first 
criminal moral rights conviction in Colombian history.  In this article, Mr. Castellanos 
explains how the Court based its decision on a broad interpretation of the personhood 
theory of copyright, without any discussion of the theory itself or its alternatives.  He 
then suggests potential problems with the Court’s perspective; namely, that it might grant 
monopolies on unoriginal expressions and ideas, and thus stifle free expression.  As a 
solution, the article proposes that Colombian judges develop and/or adapt analytical tools 
for filtering out a work’s unprotectable elements from the original, protectable elements, 
focusing on the idea/expression dichotomy. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The idea/expression dichotomy amounts to a distinction 
between authorship and copyright, between the scope of what 
the author sends into the world (i.e., idea as much as 
expression) and the narrower scope of what is subject to legal 
protection (i.e., expression alone) . . . . The proposition that 
only expression is copyrightable, and not ideas, is thus 
necessarily rooted in the equality of the parties as authors.1 
                                                      
† Attorney, Rubio Oramas & Asociados.  Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Los Andes 
(Bogotá); Graduate 2009, University of Stockholm, LLM, 2013. 
‡ Juris Doctor expected in 2013, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank Señor Castellanos for his help in this project.  He would also like to thank his family, Lindsay, and 
Profesora Gómez: os quiero.  
1 Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 
16 CAN. J. L. & JUR. 1, 10-14 (Jan. 2003). 
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There is no doubt that the Supreme Court of Justice,2 in affirming 
Professor Giraldo’s two-year prison sentence and fine,3 espoused a highly 
protectionist view of authors’ moral rights.4  This view, extensively guided 
by the personhood philosophy of intellectual property (“IP”) rights, 5 
highlighted the well-known–yet rarely studied in Colombia–doctrinal and 
jurisprudential tension woven into the idea/expression dichotomy. 
The decision also showed that the Supreme Court of Justice was open 
to comparative legal analyses.  Even if only undertaken in dicta, these 
analyses represent valid analytical attempts at tackling the complex world of 
copyright law.6 
For better or worse–this article does not normatively judge the Court’s 
sentence against Professor Giraldo–one should also acknowledge that, after 
several years of silence on the subject of authors’ rights (an issue that for 
many, including lawyers and academics, seems more poetic than the “The 
World of Giovanni Quessep”), the Court not only developed guidelines for 
deciding whether someone plagiarizes an “unpublished work,” but also acted 
as a quasi-legislator.7  Illustrating this latter point, the Court demanded that 
                                                      
2  [Translator’s Note] The Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) is the highest 
Colombian court for criminal appeals.  Antonio Ramirez, An Introduction to Colombian Governmental 
Institutions and Primary Legal Sources, GLOBALEX, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Colombia.htm 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
3  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala Pen. mayo 28, 2010, M.P: S. Espinosa 
Pérez, Casación, (No. 31.403), available at http://190.24.134.121/webcsj/Documentos/Comunicorte/Decisi
ones/FALLO%20DERECHOS%20DE%20AUTOR%2031403%20(28-05-2010)[1].pdf (Colom.)  
[hereinafter Giraldo].   
4  [Translator’s Note] A few points on Colombia’s copyright regime.  Colombian copyright protects 
authors’ economic and moral rights in their work.  See DIRECCIÓN DE DERECHO DE AUTOR, MANUAL DE 
DERECHO DE AUTOR (2010),  
http://derechodeautor.gov.co/htm/Publicaciones/Cartilla%20derecho%20de%20autor%20(Alfredo%20Veg
a).pdf.  Economic rights are authors’ rights to exploit their work for profit, including the rights to publish 
and distribute the work.  See Robert P. Merges, Peter S. Menell & Mark A. Lemley, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 413, 416-17 (5th ed. 2010).  Moral rights are an author’s 
personal interest in the work and, in Colombia, include the right to claim authorship, the right to object to 
modifications of the work, the right to publish (or not publish) a work, and the right to withdraw a work 
after publication.  See L. 23, enero 28, 1982 (Colom.), translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex
/en/text.jsp?file_id=126025.  These rights are perpetual and cannot be relinquished.  Id. 
5  See discussion infra Part.II. 
6  [Translator’s Note] Technically, the Colombian term “derecho de autor” translates as author’s 
right, author’s rights, or authors’ rights.  In the United States, the French equivalent “droit d’auteur” may be 
more familiar.  Because “copyright” is a more familiar term to English-speakers, and the Colombian 
National Copyright Directorate translates the term as “copyright,” this article translates “derecho de autor” 
as “copyright.” 
7  It is worth asking whether this action violates the principle of judicial restraint, which holds that 
“the legislative branch is the only branch with the power to produce criminal standards.  This is so because, 
in addition to being its assigned role within the government’s division of powers, legislators are popularly 
elected, something essential in making law, particularly criminal law, which–as the Constitutional Court 
has stated–by its nature should be preceded by a process of public debate and education over its conception 
and implementation; that is to say, by a more democratic process.”  Corte Constitucional 
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“in the interest of precipitating the clarification of the law,”8 the Ministry of 
Interior and Justice, the Congress, and the National Copyright Directorate 
(DNDA) should “incorporate, both amply and with specificity, the principal 
facets of authors’ moral rights protection, in order to avoid ambiguities or 
misunderstandings that can call into question the profound protection that 
moral rights–we reiterate–fundamentally deserve.”9  
Against this backdrop, this article will attempt to explain to the reader, 
first, the reasons why the decision evidenced a court both guided by a 
personhood perspective of moral rights and–by establishing additional 
criminal sanctions for their violation–highly protective of these rights.10  
These philosophies led the Court to apply the pro homine principle,11 in 
order to ensure that Article 270 of the Criminal Code12 “adequately”13–in 
accord with Colombia’s international agreements–protected authors’ moral 
rights.  In developing this connection–and after discussing why I think the 
Court adopted this view–I will comment on the principal problem with this 
                                                                                                                                                              
[C.C.][Constitutional Court], agosto 4, 1999, M.P. A. Martínez Caballero, Sentencia C-559/99, available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1999/c-559-99.htm.   
8  [Translator’s Note] The Court is referring to the moral rights section, Article 270 of the criminal 
code.  See infra note 12. 
9  Giraldo, supra note 2, at 83. 
10  I would also like to clarify that this article does not address whether instrumentalist or utilitarian 
justifications for moral rights–focusing on moral rights as a means, not an end in of themselves, to 
maximizing social utility–are preferable to a natural rights based view, or vice versa.  Nor does the article 
discuss whether instrumentalist or utilitarian perspectives are the only theoretical means of explaining the 
public domain.  On the contrary, this article acknowledges that–as Professor Drassinower argues–a rights-
based view can limit authors’ rights to account for the public domain.  See Drassinower, supra note 1.   
11  [Translator’s Note] The pro homine principle is a “standard for interpreting human rights law, 
according to which, internationally recognized human rights . . . are to be interpreted as broadly as 
possible.”  Ernesto Rengifo García, ¿Es el plagio una conducta reprimida por el derecho penal?, 14 
REVISTA DE LA PROPIEDAD INMATERIAL 303, 304 (2010) (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional 
Court], mayo 10, 2006, M.Ps:  J. Araújo Rentería, C. Vargas Hernández, Sentencia C-355/06, (Colom.), 
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/c-355-06.htm). 
12  [Translator’s note] Article 270 of the Colombian Criminal Code provides criminal sanctions for 
moral rights violations.  It punishes anyone who:  
1. Publishes, completely or partially, without the previous and express permission of 
the right-holder, an unpublished work of literature, art, science, film, audiovisual or 
phonographic nature, computer program or software. 
2.  Enters into the national registry with the name of anyone other than the true 
author, or with the title altered or removed, or with the text altered, defaced, modified or 
mutilated, or the editor or producer’s name falsely stated, a work of literature, art, 
science, film, audiovisual or phonographic nature, computer program or software. 
3.   By any means or procedure, condenses, mutilates or transforms, without the 
previous and express permission of the right-holder, a work of literature, art, science, 
film, audiovisual or phonographic nature, computer program or software. 
13  By placing adequately in quotes I do not mean to suggest that applying the pro homine principle to 
criminal moral rights protection generates a per se defense of instrumental or utilitarian based views of 
moral rights.  See supra note 10.   
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perspective, focusing on the importance of differentiating cases of 
plagiarism from those that involve the free use of ideas, thoughts, methods, 
formulas, or concepts. 
Second, and intimately linked to this last problem, I will examine the 
need to study–not transfer or transplant–analytical tools that will rationally 
and objectively lead to the appropriate differentiation between plagiarism 
and the free use of ideas.  This section requires, on the one hand, a 
reexamination of the idea/expression dichotomy and, on the other, an 
explanation of how North American courts have developed analytical tools 
that help identify the protectable and non-protectable elements that an 
allegedly plagiarized work can contain and/or integrate into its creative 
structure. 
On this point, I would like to make clear that these references to North 
American courts (especially the Ninth Circuit) do not represent any 
capricious desire to vindicate transplanting and implementing these tools 
into Colombia’s legal system, something that has increasingly occurred in 
moral rights and plagiarism cases.  Rather, the references are made with the 
intention of providing a comparative perspective of the efforts those courts 
have made to prevent copyright law from granting monopolies on ideas.14  
Finally, and reiterating that this article does not intend to normatively 
judge the Court’s sentence against Professor Giraldo, I will conclude by 
recommending that Colombian judges consider developing analytical tools–
within a Colombia-specific framework–that will help them rationally and 
objectively identify, a priori, the distinction between ideas and expression, 
an analysis often involved in plagiarism cases.  In the absence of these tools, 
as I will emphasize, judges run the risk of not only granting monopolies on 
ideas or expressions that do not deserve protection, but also violating 
international agreements that preach the necessity of balancing authors’ 
legitimate interests with the users’ legitimate interests in freely accessing 
and using prior works’ ideas, concepts, formulas, or methods. 
                                                      
14  I find it necessary to recall Benjamin Kaplan’s An Unhurried View of Copyright (Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1967), in which Kaplan insists on the need to reevaluate the current state of copyright, in order to 
save the system from its expansion in scope and protection.  
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II. USING THE PERSONHOOD PERSPECTIVE TO INTERPRET THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF AUTHORS’ MORAL RIGHTS 
A. An Introduction to the Personhood Theory 
Among the many different philosophies15 used to analyze the political, 
economic, and social purposes of IP, one finds the personhood theory, a 
philosophy used to justify both IP protection in general and copyright 
specifically. 16   
Hegel’s explanations of the relationship between personality and IP 
rights provide the basis for the theory.  To Hegel, “intellectual property need 
not be justified by analogy to physical property.  In fact, the analogy [] may 
distort the status Hegel ascribes to personality and mental traits in relation to 
the will.”17  As Justin Hughes explains in his seminal work on the subject,18 
this philosophy is therefore unique in that:  
The persona is the one type of potential intellectual property 
which is generally thought of as not being a result of labor.  
Even if the persona is considered to be a product of labor, 
people would work on their personas without any property 
rights being necessary to motivate them.  Therefore, the 
instrumental labor justification is not necessary.  In contrast, the 
persona is the ideal property for the personality justification.  
No intermediary concepts such as ‘expression’ or 
‘manifestation’ are needed:  the persona is the reaction of 
society and a personality.  Property rights in the persona give 
the individual the economic value derived most directly from 
one's personality.19  
Thus, when applied to authors’ rights, this theory holds that one’s 
personhood comprises not just the “persona,” but also poems, stories, novels, 
musical works, sculptures, and paintings.  More succinctly, as Justice 
                                                      
15  Theories such as legal realism, critical legal studies, law and economics, and law in context have 
elaborated discussions attempting to give clarity, to propose reforms, and to justify or decry the protection 
given by IP law. 
16  For fuller discussions of the theory see, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
Possession, 51 OHIO STATE L.J. 517 (1990); Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
17  Hughes, supra note 16, at 337. 
18  See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 184 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001) (referring to Hughes’ piece as 
“perhaps the most fully developed” on the subject). 
19  See Hughes, supra note 16, at 340 (emphasis in original).  
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Holmes stated, such works are viewed as “the personal reaction of an 
individual upon nature.”20 
A major problem with this conclusion, however, arises with copies of 
works; that is, when “[t]he writer physically manifests his will only ‘in a 
series of abstract symbols’ which can be rendered into ‘things’ by 
mechanical processes not requiring any talent.”21  In this scenario, the copier 
“does not embody his will in an object in the same way the artist does.”22  
To Hegel, this ease of copying can pose a major problem to IP rights, given 
that “the purpose of a product of mind is that people other than its author 
should understand it and make it the possession of their ideas, memory, 
thinking, etc.”23   
As a solution to this dilemma, Hegel believed “that the alienation of a 
single copy of a work need not entail the right to produce [copies].”24  Hegel 
seemed to view an author’s work as an “ongoing expression of its creator, 
not as a free, abandonable cultural object.”25  Hegel also believed the right to 
make copies of a work was “one of the ‘universal ways and means of 
expression . . . which belong to [the author].’”  Thus, “just as he does not sell 
himself into slavery, the author keeps the universal aspect of expression as 
his own.”26   The personhood perspective, therefore, precludes an author 
from transmitting all of his rights in the work. 
Yet this conclusion raises the question: “What justifies the author in 
alienating copies of his work while retaining the exclusive right to reproduce 
further copies of that work?”27  Just like with real property, an author may 
alienate his IP rights in two ways.  First, through a complete sale:  the author 
alienates all the economic rights he derived from creating–in the case of 
copyright–the artistic, literary, or scientific work.28  Second, through selling 
copies:  the author alienates copies of his work, with limitations on how 
those copies may be used.29  Unlike real property, however, an author may 
“alienate the intellectual property while keeping the ‘whole’ of the property 
and himself.”30   
                                                      
20  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
21  Id. 
22  Hughes, supra note 16, at 338. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. at 348. 
26  Id. at 338. 
27  Id. 
28  Hughes, supra note 16, at 346. 
29  Id.  
30  Id. at 349. 
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 Having established these two means of alienation, the personhood 
theory may provide a better justification than traditional common law 
theories31 for an author’s ability to transmit some IP rights while retaining 
others.32  As Hughes points out, “[t]he alienation of copies is perhaps the 
most rational way to gain exposure for one's ideas,” because “[e]ven for 
starving artists[,] recognition of this sort may be far more valuable than 
economic rewards.”33  The personhood theory therefore allows an author to 
alienate copies of his work in order to earn respect, honor, admiration, and 
money from the public, while preventing authors from surrendering all their 
rights, “most importantly, their right to prevent others from mutilating or 
misattributing their works.”34  Hughes concludes that this outcome can be 
accomplished if the author receives “public identification,” and the work 
receives “protection against any changes unintended or unapproved by the 
creator.”35 
B. The Court’s Adoption of the Personhood Theory 
Before continuing the analysis, it is worth noting that in the 
Colombian Judicial System, as opposed to common law, moral rights do not 
usually generate discussions on the tension between personality and property 
just discussed.  The silence is due to Colombian moral rights being both 
perpetual and inalienable,36 thus preventing an author from alienating all of 
his IP rights.  
What seems inconsistent about the Court’s decision, therefore, is not 
due to a conflict between personality and alienation, as in common law.  
Rather, the issue is that the Court–without even mentioning the theory, let 
alone the complexities discussed above–adopted Hegel’s personhood 
                                                      
31  [Translator’s Note] Courts in the U.S., for instance, predominantly view copyright law “as a 
statutory instrument designed to balance incentives necessary for the author’s productivity with the public 
interest in access to and dissemination of her products.”  Drassinower, supra note 1, at 1; see also supra 
note 15. 
32  See Hughes, supra note 16, at 350.   
33  Id. 
34  Philosophical Perspectives on Intellectual Property, THE BRIDGE (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/Philosophy/ipphil.htm. 
35  Hughes, supra note 16, at 350. 
36  “The moral right is born at the same time as the work, a consequence of creation, not 
administrative recognition.  These rights are non-economic, inalienable and, in principle, perpetual.  They 
are meant to protect the intellectual interests of the author and with respect to these rights, the State takes 
various actions, guaranteeing the law helps the right-holder disclose his work or keep it private, to assert his 
right of recognition for the work, to demand respect for the integrity of the work, and to retract the work.”  
Giraldo, supra note 3, at 17-18 (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court],  junio 20, 1996, 
M.P. J.C. Ortiz Gutiérrez, Sentencia C-276/96 (Colom.), available at http://www.derechodeautor.gov.co/ 
htm/legal/jurisprudencia/CD_Legal/IndiceConologico/CC.htm). 
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justification of moral rights.  This silence is especially noteworthy because 
the theory provided the basis for the Court’s decision.  
To illustrate this point, one need simply note the Court’s statement that 
moral rights, “given their fundamental nature, find support in various 
international agreements approved and ratified by the Colombian State,37 in 
the Constitution, as well as in legal norms.”38  The Court, citing a previous 
Constitutional Court39 decision, then emphatically held: 
A failure to recognize a man’s right of authorship to the fruits of 
his creativity, the exclusive manifestation of either his spirit or 
ingenuity, is a failure to recognize a man’s condition as an 
individual who thinks and creates, and by his very nature 
expresses this rationality and creativity.  For this reason, 
authors’ moral rights should be protected as rights that emanate 
from the human condition.40 
This quotation raises the question: how could the Court, without any 
discussion of these theories, much less the debates occurring outside of 
Colombia on the subject, establish that creative works represent a part of the 
human condition?  This query, in turn, leads me to ask whether the Court’s 
position represents an adoption of personhood perspective of authors’ moral 
rights–a question I unequivocally answer in the affirmative. 
It is this philosophical underpinning that led to the Court’s expansive 
interpretation of moral rights protection.  As a result, the Court did not 
simply clarify that plagiarism is included within the rights protected by 
Article 270, but also that Colombia must offer this protection in order to 
“sufficiently” and “adequately” fulfill its international agreements.41  Thus, 
under the umbrella of achieving these goals, the Court revealed the extent of 
its own personhood perspective of moral rights. 
                                                      
37  See Giraldo, supra note 3, at 13, 20-21 (citing Andean Community Decisions); id. at 15 (citing the 
Berne Convention); id. at 18 (citing the 1948 UN Human Rights Charter); id. at 22 (citing the Rome 
Agreement of 1961).  [Translator’s Note] Colombia is a party to the Andean convention and therefore 
subject to that court’s judicial decisions.  See Camilo A. Rodriguez Yong, Enhancing Legal Certainty in 
Colombia: The Role of the Andean Community, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 407, 430 (2008). 
38  See Giraldo, supra note 3, at 20. 
39  The Constitutional Court “reviews the constitutional validity of laws approved by the legislative 
branch and some decrees issued by the executive branch; and it is also responsible for procedures related to 
actions created to protect the rights of those accused of criminal offenses, or actions against abuses of 
public administration officials, including members of the judiciary. The Court thus guards the integrity and 
supremacy of the constitution; and rules on amendments to its text, and on the enforcement of  international 
treaties.”  Ramirez, supra note 2. 
40  Id. at 74 (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 28, 1998, M.P:  V. 
Naranjo Mesa, Sentencia C-155/98, (Colom.), available at http://www.derechodeautor.gov.co/htm/legal/ 
jurisprudencia/Corte%20Constitucional/C-155-98.doc) (emphasis in original).  
41  Giraldo, supra note 3, at 75. 
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Consequently–in the Court’s opinion–all Colombian judges must now 
reconcile Article 270 with international human rights standards.  The Article 
should therefore be interpreted such that section one not only protects the 
right to publish (or not publish) unpublished works but also–in a broader, 
teleological sense–authors’ moral rights.  The Court clarified that the section 
also prohibits–in addition to publishing unpublished works–the following 
acts:42 
1) Those that, through other forms of disclosure, entail the 
public diffusion of the unpublished work, without the 
previous and express permission of the right-holder; 
2) Those that entail the violation of the right of authorship or 
recognition, in accordance with the following contingencies: 
(A) When without the previous and express authorization 
of the right-holder, someone discloses in whole or in 
part, in the name of someone other than the right-
holder, an unpublished work of literature, art, science, 
film, audiovisual or phonographic nature, computer 
program or software.   
(B) When without the previous and express authorization 
of the right-holder, someone publishes completely or 
partially, in the name of another, an already disclosed 
work of literature, art, science, film, audiovisual or 
phonographic nature, computer program or 
software.43   
In these terms, the Court tacitly held–again, in accord with its broad, 
personhood perspective–that this formulation, as opposed to the actual 
                                                      
42  [Translator’s note] The original statute punishes anyone who:  
1. Publishes, completely or partially, without the previous and express permission 
of the right-holder, an unpublished work of literature, art, science, film, audiovisual 
or phonographic nature, computer program or software. 
2. Enters into the national registry with the name of anyone other than the true 
author, or with the title altered or removed, or with the text altered, defaced, 
modified or mutilated, or the editor or producer’s name falsely stated, a work of 
literature, art, science, film, audiovisual or phonographic nature, computer program 
or software. 
3. By any means or procedure, condenses, mutilates or transforms, without the 
previous and express permission of the right-holder, a work of literature, art, science, 
film, audiovisual or phonographic nature, computer program or software. 
 
CÓDIGO PENAL (Criminal Code) (C. PEN) art. 270 (Colom.).   
43  Id. at 78-79.  For a comparison, see the original statute, supra note 42. 
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statute,44 would “fully protect” the moral rights of authorship, recognition, 
publication, and integrity.45  
Without judging whether the Court’s adoption and extension of the 
personhood perspective was appropriate or not, it is worth discussing what I 
believe to be the principal problem this position poses to Colombia:  the 
possible failure in the judicial process of identifying and distinguishing cases 
of plagiarism from those involving the free use of ideas, thoughts, and 
concepts.  The potential number of criminal sentences for plagiarism–either 
menial46 or elaborate47–is great if one understands authors’ moral rights to 
cover all situations in which an individual “thinks, creates [] and expresses 
[his] rationality and creativity.”48 
This interpretation is not, amongst other things, entirely the goal of IP.  
Rather, as Article 7 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) states, IP seeks to “contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”49   
It is therefore valid to ask to what extent a rigid and extensive 
interpretation of the personhood perspective–as applied to authors’ moral 
rights–could affect the free circulation of ideas. 
Of note, unlike what the Court stated, it is not so easy–though not 
impossible–to distinguish between plagiarism and the free use of ideas by 
simply establishing that the essential element of plagiarism is the 
“appropriation of original and novel expressions, understood as the result of 
the activity of the spirit, which evidence individuality and creation, but 
keeping in mind that in many occasions similarities may be due to chance, of 
the development of an idea within the same social framework.”50  That is, it 
does not seem so easy to differentiate between cases of plagiarism and the 
free use of ideas when using the Court’s rationale, because the Court’s 
                                                      
44  [Translator’s Note] For a translated version of the original statute, see supra note 42. 
45  Giraldo, supra note 3, at 79.  
46  Menial plagiarism occurs when the plagiarizer “simply suppresses the real author's name at all 
without touching the content of the work.”  Giraldo, supra note 3, at 80-81. 
47  Elaborate plagiarism occurs when the plagiarizer “extracts important parts of the original work in 
order to incorporate them into his.”  Giraldo , supra note 3, at 81. 
48  Giraldo, supra note 3, at 74 (citations omitted). 
49  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. VII, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS].  
50  Vicente E. Gaviria Londoño, Delitos contra los derechos de autor, in LECCIONES DE DERECHO 
PENAL, PARTE ESPECIAL (2003) 557 (citing ALEJANDRO GÓNZALEZ GÓMEZ, EL TIPO DE LOS DELITOS 
CONTRA LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL 192 (1998)). 
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interpretive and analytical framework featured a broad personhood 
perspective of authors’ moral rights.   
Consequently, Colombian judges following this interpretation could 
have problems when addressing ambiguous questions, such as “[a]re there 
intellectual works that do not involve an expression of the activity of the 
spirit of the author, but show individuality, originality, and novelty in the 
creative process?”  The answer is likely circular, and distracts from the 
ultimate goal of determining plagiarism in actual cases.  Such questions are 
useful, however, because they lead to a discussion of the paradigms and 
elements that both characterize and justify the Court’s personhood 
perspective of authors’ moral rights.  For example, this perspective: allows 
individuals to assert their free will and be recognized by third parties; 
promotes individuality, understood as the identity a person derives from his 
work; and relies on the author’s benevolence, something essential for third 
parties to express their ideas on the author’s original work. 
However, these benefits also run contrary to IP’s goal of 
disseminating technology by suppressing “the revolutionary social and 
cultural implications of our increasingly powerful copying technology.”51  
The law would thus continue consumption-based social distinctions and 
serve as “Sumptuary Intellectual Property Law.”52  On this point, Barton 
Beebe recently argued that IP in general–and copyright in particular–already 
serves as a judicial tool for maintaining the social status quo.53  Beebe points 
out that many courts, in assessing damages in copyright infringement cases, 
have adopted anti-dilution rationales, basing damages on the harm of the 
infringing work’s “availability and prevalence.” 54   This conception of 
copyright runs contrary to the traditional idea that authors are compensated 
based on the originality of their work, not its distinctiveness.  Such a law 
would therefore twist the teleology of the IP system, namely, authors’ rights 
in original, creative works, into trademark rights in distinctive–not original–
marks.  
This is all to say that there are numerous important interests wrapped 
into each intellectual creation, and improper plagiarism analysis could lead 
to sacrificing the free use of ideas for the sake of authors’ moral rights.  The 
                                                      
51  Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 810 
(2010). 
52  “Through Sumptuary intellectual property law, we seek in particular to suppress the revolutionary 
social and cultural implications of our increasingly powerful copying technology. Sumptuary intellectual 
property law is thus taking shape as the socially and culturally reactionary antithesis of the more familiar 
technologically progressive side of intellectual property law.”  Id. 
53  See id.   
54  Id. at 861 (citing Spinmaster, Ltd. v. Overbreak LLC, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 
2005)). 
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result could be legally granted monopolies on ideas, with future authors’ 
creative processes subject to these rights holders’ benevolence. 
Finally, this discussion stresses the importance of recognizing that 
authors’ rights are founded and justified on the understanding that 
“copyrighting ideas is inconsistent with the doctrine of originality and its 
normatively necessary corollary, the defense of independent creation.”55 
III. THE NEED TO DEVELOP AND/OR ADAPT ANALYTICAL TOOLS TO DEFINE 
THE IDEA/EXPRESSION BOUNDARY 
As noted in the previous pages, distinguishing between plagiarism and 
the free use of ideas is a difficult process, especially with an expansive 
personhood theory of moral rights.  This reality forces us to find and/or 
restructure analytical tools that allow us to distinguish, a priori, between 
ideas and expressions thereof, and also to decide if a particular case falls 
within the type of crime Article 270 describes.  On one hand, we have the 
Supreme Court stating that “it is fundamental, in analyzing conduct which 
could involve the violation of authors’ moral rights, to distinguish the free 
use of ideas, from the appropriation of the expression of those ideas, because 
only the latter will trigger criminal sanctions.”56  On the other hand, it is 
complicated to develop this distinction given that, in the words of Judge 
Learned Hand, “[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can.”57 
As a first methodological step in arriving at a rational and objective 
approach to this thorny issue, it is interesting to observe, in comparative 
terms, how North American courts–particularly the Ninth Circuit (ironically, 
the very court that the Supreme Court of Justice cites in its opinion)–have 
developed a series of analytical and interpretive tools targeted at defining, 
filtering, and distinguishing unprotectable ideas from the protectable 
expressions thereof.  This dichotomy,  as the Supreme Court of Justice 
properly expressed, “explains why there are hundreds or even thousands of 
works that are based on a single idea, yet these works do not infringe the 
original thinker’s rights as, we reiterate, what is protected is the style, 
language, and the forms used to express human thought.”58   The Ninth 
Circuit has stated that this determination–separating ideas from expressions 
thereof–is the Court’s true objective in an infringement case.59 
                                                      
55  Drassinower, supra note 1, at 14.   
56  Giraldo, supra note 3, at 28 (emphasis added). 
57  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
58  Giraldo, supra note 3, at 27. 
59  Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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The two primary analytical tools used by the Ninth Circuit to separate 
ideas from expressions are the merger doctrine and scènes à faire.  It is 
worth mentioning that “[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to when an 
imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its 
‘expression.’”60  However, these tools are important because, at the very 
least, they provide a rational means of reconciling two legitimate 
socioeconomic interests: compensating the author for his effort and 
originality; and ensuring the social and economic benefit of using that idea.61 
First, the merger doctrine holds that “[w]hen an idea is inseparable 
from its own expression, that idea is said to merge with the expression, and 
such expression, despite any originality, is denied copyright protection.”62  
The doctrine stands for the fact that a third party cannot infringe an author’s 
rights if the original work’s underlying ideas can only be expressed in a 
single form; the original work was not protectable in the first place.  To hold 
otherwise, “would confer a monopoly over the idea itself,”63 which would 
likely limit expression. 
Second, scènes à faire is defined as “sequences of events which 
necessarily follow from a common theme.  ‘[S]imilarity of expression . . . 
which necessarily results from the fact that the common idea is only capable 
of expression in more or less stereotyped form will preclude a finding of 
actionable similarity.’” 64   For example, architectural plans may contain 
generalized notions of where to locate functional elements such as roads or 
the best engineering methods to use.  To the extent these plans or–to be more 
precise–these functional elements are “ideas,” they cannot be protected 
under copyright. 65   Also, in literature, scènes à faire  would prevent 
protection of the “overlapping sequences of events” that derive from “the 
thematic concept that to a lost child, the familiar face of the mother is the 
most beautiful face, even though the mother is not, in fact, beautiful to 
most.”66  Similarly, “a spy novel usually contains items such as luxury cars, 
numbered Swiss bank accounts, a femme fatale or [ ] spy gadgets hidden in 
watches, belts, shoes or umbrellas; but the work in which these elements 
appear would not be plagiarizing an earlier work also containing these 
                                                      
60  Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Werner, 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
61  See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp, 602 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2010) (analyzing 
alleged architectural plagiarism). 
62  Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990). 
63  Fin. Control Assocs., Inc. v. Equity Builder, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1118 (D. Kan. 1992). 
64  Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). 
65  Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 68. 
66  Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92. 
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elements.”67  That is, “[t]he fact that Shakespeare wrote a story about star-
crossed lovers cannot mean that he has a proprietary claim on all stories 
about star-crossed lovers.”68  Further, as the Ninth Circuit stated, “Degas 
can’t prohibit other artists from painting ballerinas and Charlaine Harris 
can’t stop Stephanie Meyer from publishing Twilight just because Sookie 
came first.”69 
In conclusion, scènes à faire prevents protecting elements of a work 
derived from expressions or representations that necessarily flow from one 
common idea.  In the face of this principle, one can see that authors cannot 
protect common topics within a genre or theme.  Nor do these rights protect 
elements that naturally flow from the subject more than from the author’s 
creativity, or elements that are dictated merely by functional or external 
factors. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the complications brought about by the implementation  
and/or application of these doctrines to actual cases (e.g., determining who 
has the burden of proving the original work’s ideas or expression thereof; 
whether the doctrines should be affirmative defenses or elements in the 
definition of copyright infringement)70, it is important to understand that 
these analytical tools are filtering unoriginal items out from authors’ rights 
protection.71  This filtering will, prima facie, allow a fair balancing between 
the work’s protectable elements and its unprotectable free ideas.  Therefore, 
in cases where the original work has numerous unoriginal elements, there 
would need to be “virtual identity” between the works to find infringement.72 
The ultimate question then, given the Court’s broad, personhood 
based interpretation of Article 270, is what would have happened in this case 
if the courts had used these analytical tools to rationally measure–before 
judging the alleged conduct–the spectrum of protection available to the 
allegedly infringed work.  More specifically, was the range of expression 
                                                      
67  S.A.P., Nov. 22, 2007 (Madrid, Spain) available at http://audiencias.vlex.es/vid/intelectual-
proyeccion-peliculas-indemnizacion-37390826.  
68  Drassinower, supra note 1, at 17. 
69  Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010). 
70  For a full discussion of these points, see Andrew B. Hebl, A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of 
Copyright’s Merger and Scenes a Faire Doctrines, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128 (2007). 
71  See Drassinower, supra note 1, at 18-19 (“The Plaintiff´s ideas cannot be copyrighted in the name 
of the protection of the plaintiff’s authorship because the copyright of ideas in fact denies the possibility of 
the defendant’s authorship . . . . The defendant’s equal dignity as an author is the concept by way of which 
a rights-based approach to copyright law insists upon the preservation of and cultivation of the public 
domain.”).  
72  Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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limited such that certain elements merged with the work’s underlying idea?  
Were certain elements necessary to discuss the idea?  The answers to these 
questions could have made “virtual identity” the appropriate standard for 
infringement in this case. 
As this article does not set out to answer these questions, it is enough 
to say that, given the Court’s broad interpretation of moral rights, Colombian 
judges need to be careful in deciding both plagiarism cases and sentences.  
Given that under this precedent, there is no a priori distinction between the 
protectable and unprotectable elements of the literary, artistic, or scientific 
work allegedly plagiarized; a failure to distinguish between these elements 
could grant monopolies on the allegedly infringed work’s functional ideas, 
methods, or concepts. 
This need is particularly important, as the Court itself referenced 
when using the Constitution to justify applying the pro homine principle to 
Article 270, because a failure to create distinctions creates the risk that 
Colombia could fail to fulfill its international treaty obligations, such as the 
aforementioned TRIPS Article 7.  That is, authors’ rights may cease to 
“contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”73  This would 
be a world in which authors’ moral rights are incredibly poetic, but also 




                                                      
73  TRIPS, supra note 49, at art. 7. 
